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OF LINKS AND LEGAL MERITS––GOOD FAITH IN THE
STATUTORY DERIVATIVE ACTION IN SINGAPORE
PEARLIE KOH*
ABSTRACT
An applicant for leave to bring a statutory derivative action in Singapore is required to satisfy
the court as to, inter alia, his good faith. Although the statutory language places the burden of
doing so on the applicant, Singapore courts have tended to assume the presence of good faith if
the claim is a legitimate one. This approach, which denigrates the requirement of good faith,
was recently disapproved by the Singapore Court of Appeal. This notwithstanding,
subsequent cases have reverted to the earlier position, casting doubt on the utility of the
requirement. This paper considers good faith, and argues that it was included to address a
distinct concern that cannot be met by a consideration of the viability of the claim and the
company’s interests in pursuing the same, a concern that arose out of the peculiar function
of the statutory derivative action in opening up shareholder access to corporate litigation.
A INTRODUCTION
The statutory procedure for bringing a derivative action in Singapore, which was
introduced in 1993, is found in ss 216A and 216B of the Companies Act.1 Pur-
suant thereto, a ‘complainant’ may apply to the court for leave to bring an
action in the name of and on behalf of the company, or to intervene in an
action to which the company is a party.2 The complainant is required to satisfy
the court as to three matters before the court will grant leave.3 First, the complai-
nant must have given 14 days’ notice to the directors of the company of his inten-
tion to apply to the court if the directors of the company do not bring, diligently
* LLM (Melb), Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. Email:
pearliekoh@smu.edu.sg. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their constructive com-
ments. All errors remain mine.
1 Companies Act (Cap 50) (‘CA’), s 216A is modelled after the statutory derivative action in the Cana-
dian Business Corporations Act. A statutory procedure for the bringing of derivative actions may also
be found in New Zealand (Companies Act 1993 (NZ), ss 165–68), Australia (Corporations Act 2001
(Cth), part 2F.1A) and the UK (Companies Act 2006 (UK), ss 260–64). For further comparative
reading, see Dan Puchniak, Harald Baum and Michael Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in
Asia – A Comparative and Functional Approach (CUP 2012).
2 CA, s 216A(1).
3 CA, s 216A(3).
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prosecute, or defend, or discontinue the action;4 secondly, the complainant is
acting in good faith;5 and thirdly, that it appears to be prima facie in the interests
of the company that the action be brought, prosecuted, defended or discontinued.6
These preconditions serve as a screening mechanism to sift out cases that are
without merit.
Although it had a slow start, recent years have seen a relative increase, albeit
still modest, in the number of applications under section 216A of the CA.7
Most recently, the Singapore Court of Appeal had the occasion to consider
the second and third preconditions in Ang Thiam Swee v Low Hian Chor.8 In par-
ticular, the judgment, delivered on the Court’s behalf by Rajah JA, provided a
close and careful analysis of the requirement for good faith, and in so doing,
overturned a longstanding assumption hitherto adopted by the courts in con-
nection with the burden of proof. The judgment is without doubt an important
one in the area of shareholder litigation in Singapore as it provides the most
comprehensive judicial consideration of the element of good faith to date.
Nevertheless, it has been asserted that the concerns articulated by Rajah JA
may be ‘mediated through the interests of the company requirement’, casting
doubt on the relevance and utility of the good faith requirement.9 Indeed,
the post-Ang Thiam Swee decision of the Singapore High Court in Chan Tong
Fan v Chiam Heng Luan Realty Pte Ltd10 appears to lend at least tacit support
for this view.
In this paper, I ponder the relevance of good faith.11 I begin by considering the
extant judicial approach to the requirement which lent support to this negative
view of good faith. I then proceed to consider the requirement against the analyti-
cal backdrop usefully provided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Ang Thiam
4 CA, s 216A(3)(a).
5 CA, s 216A(3)(b).
6 CA, s 216A(3)(c).
7 From a survey (as at 12 August 2014) of the judgments reported on Lawnet (www.lawnet.com.sg),
there were 7 applications between 1993 and 2003 (inclusive) and 13 applications between 2004
and 2014.
8 [2013] SGCA 11 (Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA)).
9 Dan Puchniak and Cheng Tan, ‘Company Law’ (2012) 13 Singapore Academy of Law Annual
Review of Singapore Cases 143, [9.25].
10 [2013] SGHC 192 (Singapore High Court (SGHC)). This case is considered in more detail below.
See also the critique in ibid 179, [9.30].
11 This paper focuses on an issue that is not infrequently raised in jurisdictions that provide for the
private enforcement of directors’ duties by shareholders through the medium of the statutory deriva-
tive action. The wider question whether private enforcement or public enforcement ought to be
accorded dominance is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to other works in
the area, including, Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park and Steven Shavell, ‘When are Shareholder
Suits in Shareholder Interests?’ (1993–94) 82 Georgetown Law Journal 1733; Renee Jones and
Michelle Welsh, ‘Toward a Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight’ (2012)
45 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 343; Martin Gelter, ‘Why Do Shareholder Derivative
Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe’ (2011–12) 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 843;
Professor Ian Ramsay also delivered a keynote address that touched on the issue at the Comparative
Enforcement of Corporate and Securities Laws in Asia Conference, 17–18 July 2014, Singapore.
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Swee. The requirement of good faith must have been included as a pre-requisite to
serve a distinct function from the interests of the company requirement. The key, it
is submitted, is in identifying and appreciating this distinct purpose, which should
then assist in any attempt at deﬁning a framework for the operationalisation of the
criterion. As much of the negativity directed at the good faith requirement appears
to hinge on the difﬁculties associated with its proof, a workable conceptual frame-
work should go some distance to pacify detractors. Rajah JA has, in Ang Thiam
Swee, provided such a framework, which this paper will examine. It is useful to
note that, despite its inherent vagueness, good faith is nevertheless made a pre-
requisite for the grant of leave to bring derivative proceedings in a number of
other jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada and South Africa. The statutory
derivative claim in the UK is structured somewhat differently,12 but even there,
good faith is one of a number of factors the court is obliged to take account of
in considering whether to give permission for the action.13 In this regard, it
seems unlikely that the English court will grant permission to a claimant who
lacked good faith.14
In stark contrast to these jurisdictions, the statutory derivative procedure of
New Zealand does not make any reference to good faith at all.15 Instead, a
‘broad discretion’ is vested in the court whether or not to grant leave.16
Whilst the statutory provision does provide a number of speciﬁc matters to
which the court must have regard,17 it has been stated that the court’s discretion
is ‘undiminished by the particular considerations referred’18 therein. Indeed, in
a number of cases, the New Zealand courts have considered it relevant to have
regard to the applicant’s motives.19 As we shall soon see, a consideration of
the motives of the applicant is an important step towards establishing his
good faith.
12 Companies Act 2006 (UK), Pt 11.
13 See Companies Act 2006 (UK), s 263(3).
14 See Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch) (England and Wales Chancery Division
(Ch)) [122]. See also Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Com No 246, 1997) [6.75]–[6.76].
15 Companies Act 1993 (NZ), s 165(3) mandates that the court must be satisﬁed either that the company
does not intend to bring proceedings, or that it is in the interests of the company that the conduct of
the proceedings should not be left to the directors or to the determination of the shareholders as a
whole. Section 165(2) lists a number of factors that the court must have regard to. See generally Lang
Thai andMatt Berkahn, ‘Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia and New Zealand: What CanWe
Learn from Each Other’ (2012) 25 New Zealand Universities Law Review 371.
16 Vrij v Boyle [1995] 3 NZLR 763 (New Zealand High Court (NZHC)) 767. See also Needham v EBT
Worldwide Ltd [2006] NZHC 509 (NZHC) [19].
17 These are matters which the courts in Singapore, Canada and Australia would generally take
account of when considering whether it would be in the company’s interests for the subject litigation
to proceed, including the likelihood of the proceedings succeeding, the costs of the proceedings and
the interests of the company in commencing the proceedings.
18 Vrij v Boyle (n 16) (Fisher J).
19 See eg Torrice v Hayhow CIV-2003-485-1995 (NZHC) [31]; Cameron v Coleman CIV-2010-485-2151
(NZHC) [24]; Needham (n 16) [62], [65]. See also Nobilo v Nobilo [2014] NZHC 401 (NZHC) [24],
where counsel for the respondent raised this argument.
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B ON ‘GOOD FAITH’
1 Emaciating Good Faith –– The Burden of Proof
Before the court may grant leave to the applicant to bring a derivative action in the
name and on behalf of the company, the court must be satisﬁed, inter alia, that ‘the
complainant is acting in good faith’.20 The statutory language is clear—the appli-
cant’s good faith must be proved. Given that it is the applicant who is seeking
leave, the general rule, semper necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit, should apply.
Indeed, as Rajah JA noted, this represents the Australian21 and Canadian22 pos-
itions.23 However, in Agus Irawan v Toh Teck Chye,24 Choo Han Teck JC (as he then
was) had expressed the view that, if there was a reasonable and legitimate claim
against the respondent, the burden should be on the latter to show that the appli-
cant did not act in good faith. In Choo JC’s view, the court should be ‘entitled (… )
to assume that every party who comes to court with a reasonable and legitimate
claim is acting in good faith—unless proven otherwise’.25 His Honour’s view
was considered ‘generally beyond reproach’ by a differently constituted Court
of Appeal in Pang Yong Hock v PKS Contracts Services Pte Ltd.26 This evidential
approach has generally been adopted by the Singapore High Court. Thus, in
Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn v Airtrust (Singapore) Pte Ltd,27 the Court, upon ﬁnding that
the applicant had raised claims which ‘contained some semblance of merit’,28
placed the burden of showing that the application was made in bad faith upon
the defendant wrongdoer.
It should be readily appreciated that the threshold for the presumption to arise
in favour of the applicant is rather low. All that is necessary is for the applicant to
have shown that there was an ‘arguable case or cause of action’,29 or a ‘prima facie
20 CA, s 216A has in fact a wider scope of application in that it allows leave to be granted to the com-
plainant ‘to intervene in an action to which the company is a party’: s 216A(2).
21 Swansson v R A Pratt Properties Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 583 (New South Wales Supreme Court
(NSWSC)) [52]; South Johnstone Mill Ltd v Dennis and Scales [2007] FCA 1448 (Federal Court of Aus-
tralia (FCA)) [68]; Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 52 (New South Wales Court of Appeal
(NSWCA)) [67]; Vinciguerra v MG Corrosion Consultants Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 763 (FCA) [54].
22 See, inter alia, Lost Lake Properties Ltd v Sunshine Ridge Properties Ltd [2009] BCSC 938, 179 ACWS (3d)
1101 (British Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC)); Discovery Enterprises Inc v Ebco Industries Ltd (1997) 40
BCLR (3d) 43 [72], [118] (BCSC); afﬁrmed (1998) 50 BCLR (3d) 195 (British Columbia Court of
Appeal (BCCA)).
23 See Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [19]–[20].
24 [2002] SGHC 49 (SGHC) 471.
25 ibid [9].
26 [2004] SGCA 18 (SGCA) [19]. The court had opined that good faith may be best demonstrated by
showing a ‘legitimate claim which the directors are unreasonably reluctant to pursue with the appro-
priate vigour or at all’: ibid [20].
27 [2011] SGHC 88 (SGHC) 980. See also Poondy Radhakrishnan v Sivapiragasam s/o Veerasingam [2009]
SGHC 228 (SGHC).
28 ibid [73].
29 Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn [2011] SGHC 88 (SGHC) [23].
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case’,30 or, expressed negatively, that the action is ‘not frivolous or vexatious’. It
cannot be denied that the Agus Irawan approach does make much practical
sense. Good faith is not a concept that is readily susceptible of positive proof.
What is good faith but the lack of bad faith? As one commentator has observed:
[Good faith is] an excluder. It is a phrase without general meaning (or meanings) of its
own and serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith. In a par-
ticular context the phrase takes on speciﬁc meaning, but usually this is only by way of
contrast with the speciﬁc form of bad faith actually or hypothetically excluded.31
However, the effect of the beguilingly simple approach advocated in Agus Irawan
is to emaciate the requirement of good faith. There is little reason for the courts to
subject the applicant’s motives and purpose to careful consideration and analysis,
as the existence of an arguable case trumps all. Indeed, in Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn,32
the possibilities that ﬁrst, the applicant herself could have been in breach of her
directors’ duties, and secondly that the applicant was possessed of a collateral
purpose in making the application, were considered irrelevant and/or insufﬁcient
to support any ﬁnding of bad faith in the light of the fact that the applicant had
‘raised several legitimate claims that [the company] could pursue against [the
defendant]’.33 This approach, as Rajah JA observed in Ang Thiam Swee, has
given rise to a ‘ﬁxation on the legal merits of the proposed statutory derivative
action’, a consequence of which is that ‘local jurisprudence has been sparse on
the substantive relevance of the applicant’s motives to the assessment of his
good faith’.34
The Agus Irawan approach also precipitated the observed practice in the Singa-
pore courts to accord primacy to the interests of the company requirement.35 The
‘crucial link’ between the two requirements imposed by s 216A(3) has been judi-
cially noted on a number of previous occasions and also in Ang Thiam Swee.36 In
Pang Yong Hock,37 for example, the Singapore Court of Appeal had noted that as
a consequence of the ‘interplay of the requirements in s 216A(3)(b) and (c)’, ‘[t]
he best way of demonstrating good faith is to show a legitimate claim which the
directors are unreasonably reluctant to pursue with the appropriate vigour or at
all’.38 It should be noted that the fact that a potential action is ‘arguable’ or ‘legit-
imate’ does not necessarily mean that bringing that action will be ‘in the interests
of the company’. A distinction clearly exists between these two concepts. The
30 ibid.
31 Robert Summers, ‘“Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code’ (1968) 54 Virginia Law Review 195, 201.
32 [2011] SGHC 88 (SGHC) 980.
33 ibid [82].
34 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [30].
35 Puchniak and Tan (n 9) 143, [9.25].
36 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [13].
37 Pang Yong Hock (n 26).
38 ibid [20].
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prerequisite demands more. It demands that due consideration be given to the
further question whether, in spite of the viability of the action, it nevertheless
ought not to be pursued. The inquiry into the ‘interests of the company’ should
therefore involve weighing of the costs (ﬁnancial and intangible) of litigation
against the potential gains that might ultimately result. As the Court of Appeal
in Pang Yong Hock39 explained:
A $100 claim may be meritorious but it may not be expedient to commence an action for
it. The company may have genuine commercial considerations for not wanting to pursue
certain claims. Perhaps it does not want to damage a good, long-term, proﬁtable relation-
ship. It could also be that it does not wish to generate bad publicity for itself because of
some important negotiations which are underway.40
Nevertheless, the interests of the company prerequisite is necessarily predicated
on the legitimacy of the action, for it cannot be in the company’s interests, even on
a prima facie case, to bring an action which is without some objective basis.41 As
Rajah JA noted, ‘[t]o satisfy the requirement in s 216A(3)(c) (… ) the applicant
must cross the threshold of convincing the court that the company’s claim
would be legitimate and arguable’.42 The Agus Irawan approach therefore lent
support to the view that the interests of the company requirement occupied a
pre-eminent position. Once this requirement is established, the argument goes,
the good faith requirement should concomitantly also be satisﬁed. The applicant’s
good faith is therefore of little consequence.43
2 A Necessary Realignment
But is this the correct approach? It is certainly not supported from a textual per-
spective of s 216A of the CA. Indeed, if anything, the section quite clearly exacts a
more stringent standard of proof for good faith than ‘for the interests of the
company’ requirement. Unlike the pre-condition in s 216A(3)(c), which merely
requires the court to be satisﬁed, not that bringing the proposed derivative
39 ibid.
40 ibid [21]. See also Robash Pty Ltd v Gladstone Paciﬁc Nickel Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1235 (NSWSC) [57],
where the following factors were considered relevant to the question whether an application was in
the interests of the company: (1) the prospects of success of the proceedings; (2) the likely costs and
likely recovery if the proceedings are successful and the likely consequences if the proceedings are not
successful; (3) the nature of any indemnity the applicant has offered to the company if the proceed-
ings are brought and the likelihood of the company recovering under the indemnity; (4) the resources
the company will need to devote to the proceedings and the resources it has available; and (5) the
effect that the proceedings may have on other parts of the company’s business. See also L & B Electric
Ltd v Oickle [2005] NSSC 110 (Nova Scotia Supreme Court (NSSC)) [48].
41 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [58].
42 ibid [53].
43 This is also the view of some academic commentators: see Dennis Peterson and Matthew Cumming,
Shareholder Remedies in Canada (2nd edn (loose-leaf ed) LexisNexis 2009) [16.39]; Arad Reisberg, Deriva-
tive Actions and Corporate Governance (OUP 2007) 115–20.
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action is in the interests of the company, but that it appears to be prima facie in the
company’s interests, s 216A(3)(b) requires the court to be satisﬁed that the applicant
is acting in good faith. The applicant is, on a textual interpretation, clearly
required to positively44 satisfy the court as to his good faith.45 By exacting a
higher standard with respect to its proof, Parliament appears to have underscored
the signiﬁcance of good faith for leave to be granted under s 216A. In light of the
clear language of the statute, therefore, the Agus Irawan approach needed qualiﬁ-
cation.46 Ang Thiam Swee has now conﬁrmed that there can be no presumption of
good faith in favour of the applicant. The onus to establish good faith lies squarely
on the applicant.47
The effect of this realignment is stark as can be seen from the diametrically
opposed conclusions reached in Ang Thiam Swee in the High Court and in the
Court of Appeal. The applicant, Low, and Ang were minority shareholders in
the company, each holding a 10% stake, and also sat on the company’s board
of directors. Both had been persuaded to be part of the company by Gan, who
was then the only other director and majority shareholder in the company. In
the twenty-odd years or so since the company’s incorporation, it appeared that
Gan had effectively run the company as a sole proprietorship. In 2009, following
Gan’s conviction for making fraudulent tax claims and consequent statutory dis-
qualiﬁcation from his directorship of the company, the board (now comprising
Low and Ang) caused the company’s accounts to be professionally investigated.
The investigations revealed that Gan had misappropriated over $5 million of
the company’s funds. Low alleged that the same investigations also revealed
that Ang, as co-signatory with Gan of the company’s bank account, had also mis-
appropriated company funds in breach of his directors’ duties. He then sought
leave under s 216A to bring a derivative action in the company’s name against
Ang for the return of the misappropriated sums. Low succeeded in the High
Court.48 The learned judge found that Low had satisﬁed the pre-requisites pre-
scribed by s 216A(3) and granted leave to Low to proceed with the claims
against Ang.49 The judge’s sole ground for so concluding was that ‘[i]t appeared
prima facie that there was a signiﬁcant amount of monies that had been misappro-
priated from the [company], and that Ang had committed multiple serious
breaches of his duties as a director’.50
44 See Tremblett v SCB Fisheries Ltd (1993) 116 Nﬂd & PEIR 139 (Newfoundland Supreme Court (NSC))
[87]. See also Discovery Enterprise (n 22) [118].
45 The standard of proof is the civil standard of a balance of probabilities: Tam Tak Chuen v Eden Aesthetics
Pte Ltd (Khairul bin Abdul Rahman and another, non-parties) [2010] SGHC 24 (SGHC) [12].
46 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [23].
47 ibid.
48 Low Hian Chor v Steel Forming & Rolling Specialists Pte Ltd [2012] SGHC 10 (SGHC).
49 These were claims for payments made to Ang without basis, allowances paid to Ang’s brother,
monies paid into a personal bank account held jointly by Ang and Gan’s son, and secret commissions
paid to a customer’s employee: ibid [8].
50 ibid [7].
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On Ang’s appeal to the Court of Appeal, the appellate court disagreed with the
High Court that the requirements of s 216A had been satisﬁed. In relation to the
requirement of good faith, the court took a close look at the evidence to evince
the applicant’s motives and purpose, and concluded that the applicant had
failed to discharge his burden on two grounds. First, the evidence indicated that
the application had been ‘animated by such a compound of private motives as
to amount to a collateral purpose’,51 and secondly, Low could not have had an
honest belief in the merits of the application as it was obvious that he doubted
the veracity of the very evidence that he was himself adducing to evidence
Ang’s alleged misconduct. The court stated:
We think that the Application has indeed been animated by such a compound of private
motives as to amount to a collateral personal purpose. Any justice done for the Company
would be, at best, incidental to the advancement of Low’s own aims. (…) Given the
absence of any clear coincidence between the Company’s interests and Low’s apparent
collateral personal purpose of securing sole control of the Company, it would be a patent
abuse of process to allow him to use the Company as a vehicle for his own private objects.
(… ) [T]he raison d’être of s 216A of the Companies Act is to protect minority interests and
do justice to the company. The present application appears to be a cynical attempt to
load the scales against another minority shareholder on the pretence of doing justice
to the company, and, as such, fails at the very ﬁrst hurdle of bona ﬁdes.52
The Court of Appeal has therefore made it clear that the requirement of good
faith stands on its own and a separate consideration of the applicant’s good faith is
necessary. Unfortunately, despite the Court of Appeal’s categorical view, it would
appear that the Singapore High Court has found it difﬁcult to shake off the old
habit engendered by Agus Irawan. Two cases illustrate this.
Chan Tong Fan v Chiam Heng Luan Realty Pte Ltd53 involved an application by min-
ority shareholders for leave to commence derivative actions on behalf of the
company against the directors for breach of directors’ duties. The learned judge
dealt ﬁrst with the interests of the company requirement, stating:
The complainant has the two-fold burden of proving that (i) there is a reasonable basis for
his complaint and a legitimate or arguable action against the proposed defendants; and
(ii) it is in the interests of the company for the proposed action to be pursued.54
After subjecting the proposed claims to close examination, the judge concluded
that, out of the six proposed actions, only one was of sufﬁcient objective merit.
And this fact alone was sufﬁcient to satisfy the interests of the company require-
ment.55 The judge then proceeded to consider the good faith requirement.
51 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [46].
52 ibid.
53 [2013] SGHC 192 (SGHC).
54 ibid [33].
55 ibid [73].
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After observing that the burden of proof for good faith lay on the plaintiffs,56 the
judge stated as follows:
I accepted that the plaintiffs genuinely felt aggrieved. Unfortunately, it was clear from the
form their complaints took that, in many cases, the plaintiffs had allowed their unhappi-
ness with [the defendants] and with the way that [the company] was being run to over-
come their objectivity. In my view, the plaintiffs had taken an unduly suspicious view of
the actions of the Directors and of their motivations. (… ) To that extent I considered that the
plaintiffs had not proven their good faith. It was only as regards the treatment of the income
from the Shanghai Properties that the plaintiffs had been able to show that the
company had a legitimate cause of action.57
Despite this negative ﬁnding as to good faith, the learned judge nevertheless
granted leave in respect of that one arguable case.58 The only logical inference
that one can draw from this, with respect, somewhat odd conclusion is that the
requirement of good faith was, because of the legitimacy of that action and
thence the satisfaction of s 216A(3)(c), somehow satisﬁed. Clearly, the interests
of the company trumped good (or perhaps more accurately, bad) faith.
The second59 post-Ang Thiam Swee case that is relevant for our purposes is Lee Sen
Eder v Wee Kim Chwee60 where the main issue was whether the failure to give notice
as required by s 216A(3)(a) could be excused by the court. The applicant had
argued that it was not expedient to give notice as he had reasonable concerns
that the defendants would destroy or tamper with the evidence. The High
Court concluded that these concerns were insufﬁcient to excuse the failure to
comply with the notice requirement and dismissed the application. Given this con-
clusion, it was strictly unnecessary, as the learned judge himself noted, to consider
the other prerequisites of s 216A. However, his Honour nevertheless decided to
take that further step but only with respect to the interests of the company require-
ment. That the judge considered the good faith requirement as secondary was put
beyond conjecture as his Honour thought it ﬁt to refer to only the notice and the
interests of the company requirements as respectively, ‘Requirement 1’ and
‘Requirement 2’. The requirement of good faith was not accorded similar treat-
ment. Indeed, there was also no consideration of the applicant’s good faith at all.
56 ibid [74].
57 ibid [77] (emphasis added).
58 ibid [58]. In fact, the learned judge appears to have decided on granting leave before considering
good faith.
59 A contemporaneous decision of the High Court which may be considered neutral is Teo Seng Hoe v
IDV Concepts Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 269 (SGHC), where the court concluded as follows (at [56]):
There was a breakdown in the business relationship between Teo [the applicant] and Chew [one
of the defendants]. However, and importantly, there is no evidence to show that Teo was so motiv-
ated by vendetta, perceived or real, that his judgment would be clouded by purely personal con-
siderations. Instead, I have found that there were legitimate and arguable claims against [the
defendants] which Teo believed existed and which Chew was, for obvious reasons, not inclined
to pursue. In my judgment, Teo has shown that he brought the present proceedings in good faith.
60 [2013] SGHC 287 (SGHC).
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 233
With respect, this (non-)development in the treatment of good faith, in spite of
the clear direction given in Ang Thiam Swee, is unfortunate. The cases presented
opportunities for the framework laid down in Ang Thiam Swee to be applied to
different factual situations. They were therefore opportunities missed. Even
more lamentable perhaps is the necessary supposition that the courts continue
to view good faith as a secondary matter, seemingly without an independent
role to play. This view is clearly at odds with the clear text of the section and
does little to give effect to the role of good faith, to which we should now turn.
3 The Signiﬁcance of Good Faith
Whilst the concept of good faith is difﬁcult to deﬁne comprehensively, and its
meaning elusive,61 it is not a concept that is alien to corporate law.62 Given the
ubiquitous need for, and hence the consequential presence of, human intermedi-
aries and agents in corporate operations, the concept is necessary to ensure that
any intermediary to whom a power is conferred does not abuse the power but
exercises it for proper purposes. Thus, directors are subject to a duty to exercise
the corporate powers conferred on them in good faith and for proper purposes,63
and, to a more limited extent, shareholders when exercising their voting powers
are constrained not to do so for ulterior purposes.64 As Dixon J pointed out in
Mills v Mills,65 this constraint is essentially only one application of a general doc-
trine that ‘a person having a power, must execute it bona ﬁde for the end designed,
otherwise it is corrupt and void’.66
The inclusion of good faith as a requirement in s 216A is clearly intended to
achieve cognate objectives. The objective behind the statutory procedure in s
216A is to enable justice to be done to the company,67 and not to serve the appli-
cant’s personal or private purposes. During the second and third readings of the
61 Margaret Chew, Minority Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2007) 301. See also
Maleka Cassim, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action under the Companies Act of 2008: The Role
of Good Faith’ (2013) 130 The South African Law Journal 496, 508.
62 It has been described as a concept that ‘everyone understands’: Sean Grifﬁth, ‘Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence’ (2005) 55 Duke Law Journal 1,
4. The UK Law Commission considered it a concept that is ‘generally readily recognisable’: see Law
Commission (n 14) [6.76].
63 SeeHo Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd [2014] SGCA 22 (SGCA) [35]–[37]. See also Re Smith and Fawcett
Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (England and Wales Court of Appeal (CA)); Mills v Mills (1937–38) 60 CLR 150
(High Court of Australia (HCA)) 185.
64 Ngurli Ltd v McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425 (HCA) 438. See Re S Q Wong Holdings (Pte) Ltd (SGHC). See
also Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016 (Ch); Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch
286 (CA); Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA).
65 Mills (n 63) 185.
66 Aleyn v Belchier (1758) 1 Eden 132, 138; 28 ER 634, 637 (Lord Northington). For an example of the
principle applied outside of the corporate context, see Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd v Woolgar [1972] 1
QB 48 (CA).
67 Pang Yong Hock (n 26) [19] to which Rajah JA referred: Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [31].
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Amendment Bill68 which introduced the section, the then Minister for Finance
had stated:
To ensure that the remedies that would be open to shareholders [pursuant to s 216A] are
not abused and give rise to unjustiﬁed court action, s 216A contains strict conditions that
must be satisﬁed before any action can be brought (… )69
And in the words of Lai Kew Chai J:
Management decisions should generally be left to the board of directors. Members gen-
erally cannot sue in the name of his company. A minority shareholder could attempt to
abuse the new procedure, which would be as undesirable as the tyranny of the majority
directors who unreasonably refuse to act.70
The concern therefore is over the potential misuse of the procedure for
purposes unrelated to those intended by its inclusion into the statute books.
Similar concerns undergird the preconditions for leave in Australia71 and in
Canada.72 Indeed, these same concerns also constrained the availability of
the derivative action at common law. In Barrett v Duckett,73 Peter Gibson LJ
had said:
The shareholder will be allowed to sue on behalf of the company if he is bringing the
action bona ﬁde for the beneﬁt of the company for wrongs to the company for which
no other remedy is available. Conversely, if the action is brought for an ulterior
purpose (… ) the court will not allow the derivative action to proceed.74
The common law, therefore, as was adroitly expressed in a leading English
company law text, had ‘always been more impressed by the risk of derivative
claims being motivated by personal objectives than by the risk that conﬁning
derivative claims would lead to less litigation than the company’s interests
68 Companies (Amendment) Bill (Bill 33 of 1992). See Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [21]–[22].
69 Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Ofﬁcial Report (14 September 1992) vol 60, col 231 (emphasis
added). See Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [21].
70 Teo Gek Luang v Ng Ai Tiong [1998] 2 SLR(R) 426 (SGHC) [14].
71 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill 1998
which explained, with respect to the good faith criterion, as follows:
[6.36] In assessing whether an applicant is acting in good faith, the Court could be expected to
have regard to whether:
there was any complicity by the applicant in the matters complained of; andthe application is
being made in pursuit of an interest other than that of the company.
[6.39] The good faith requirement is designed to prevent proceedings being used to further the
purposes of the applicant, rather than the company as a whole.
See Fiduciary Limited v Morningstar Research Pty Limited (2005) 53 ACSR 732 (NSWSC) [20] where
Austin J referred to this explanation.
72 See Robert Dickerson, John Howard and Leon Getz, Proposals for a New Corporations Law for Canada
(1971) vol 1 [482], which stated that ‘[b]y requiring good faith on the part of the complainant
this provision precludes private vendettas’.
73 [1995] BCC 362 (CA) 368.
74 See further Sinwa SS (HK) Co Ltd v Morten Innhaug [2010] SGHC 157 (SGHC) [69].
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required’.75 This concern, however, is not without ground. Much of the law which
governs representatives is dictated by concerns that human inﬁrmity76 may lead
one to act in self-interest.
But there is a more directly relevant reason. Whereas corporate decision
making is generally subject to the majority rule, derivative actions bypass this
rule. The rule in Foss v Harbottle77 is (in)famous for the obstacles it placed before
every well-intentioned shareholder. Where a decision as to the alleged wrongdoing
has been taken by the majority, whether represented by the general meeting or the
board, there is no room for a minority shareholder to litigate in respect thereof. As
Jenkins LJ explained in an oft-cited passage, ‘if a mere majority of the members of
the company (… ) is in favour of what has been done, then cadit quæstio. No wrong
had been done to the company or association and there is nothing in respect of
which anyone can sue’.78 The faithful adherence to the majority rule that the
rule in Foss v Harbottle demands has been repeatedly justiﬁed. Choo Han Teck
J’s statement in Ting Sing Ning v Ting Chek Swee is representative:79
The rule is a useful one because it avoids the multiplicity of actions by individual
members by giving the right of action to the company itself; and thus, and in many
instances, prevents a minority from oppressing the majority by inﬂicting vexatious and
unwarranted legal action.80
Indeed, as Lord Wilberforce observed in Re Kong Thai Sawmill (Miri) Sdn Bhd,81
those who take interest in companies limited by shares have to accept majority
rule. And this is appropriately so because it provides a democratic decision-
making mechanism that is commercially workable.82 Nevertheless, the need to
accept and allow the exceptional case for permitting the derivative action at
common law was borne out of the recognition that an absolute adherence to
the majority rule may result in unfairness and corporate wrongs going without
remedy.83 And although the statutory procedure was introduced to ameliorate
75 Paul Davies and Sarah Worthington, Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law (9th edn, Sweet
& Maxwell 2012) [17–5].
76 Ex Parte Bennett (1805) 32 ER 893, 897 (Eldon LC).
77 (1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 ER 189.
78 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066–67.
79 [2006] SGHC 192, [2007] 1 SLR(R) (SGHC) 369; appeal was allowed [2007] SGCA 49, [2008] 1
SLR(R) (SGCA) 197 but Choo J’s comments on the rationale for the rule remains valid.
80 ibid [1].
81 [1978] 2 MLJ 227 (Privy Council (PC)) 229.
82 Chew (n 61) 7. See also BAK Rider, ‘Amiable Lunatics and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle’ (1978) 37
Cambridge Law Journal 270.
83 Wigram VC alluded to this in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 492; 67 ER 189, 203 itself when he
said:
If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by some of its members, for which no adequate
remedy remained, except that of a suit by individual corporators in their private characters,
and asking in such character the protection of those rights to which in their corporate character
they were entitled, I cannot but think that the… claims of justice would be found superior to any
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the admittedly rigid position in connection with the common law derivative action,
it merely changed the rules for shareholder access to control of corporate litiga-
tion. The fundamental nature of the statutory action remained essentially the
same. The fact that statutory inroads have been made into access rules
cannot deny the logic that sustains the rule in Foss v Harbottle. It remains indu-
bitable that the majority rule underpins much of corporate operations, and
continues to do so notwithstanding the introduction of s 216A. The grant of
leave under s 216A involves vesting the ‘extraordinary power’ in a shareholder
or other proper applicant to subject the company,84 and to commit its
resources, to ‘a position of legal conﬂict’ even if a majority of the
company,85 acting through the board of directors or some other corporate
process dictated by the company’s constitutional documents, is not supportive
of the action.86 Scrutinizing the applicant’s motivations becomes all the more
necessary as integrity of purpose takes on especial signiﬁcance because of the
very nature of the derivative action. The court must be convinced that the
applicant is seeking to bring the action for the purpose of advancing the com-
pany’s interests. If the court ﬁnds that the real purpose for the application is to
advance some personal agenda, good faith would not be present, and leave
ought not to be granted, even if there is objective merit to the case. As Pud-
dester J noted in Tremblett v SCB Fisheries Ltd,87 ‘[g]ood faith clearly is, and
must be, an essential and separate element, in light of the broad power
which would devolve [upon the applicant] on the granting of the application’.88
The good faith requirement can, to this extent, be said to accord due respect to
the majority rule.
There is another facet to the purpose of the good faith requirement, and this is
related to the question whether the particular applicant ought to be granted leave.
In focusing the inquiry on the subjective aspects of the applicant’s state of mind,
the good faith requirement checks the suitability of the applicant as a corporate
representative. Rajah JA alluded to this when he observed that an applicant
who lacked good faith may not be ‘the proper party to represent the company’s
interests’.89 At common law, this concern was manifested in the law’s
difﬁculties arising out of technical rules respecting the mode in which corporations are required to
sue.
84 Tremblett (n 44) [61] (Puddester J).
85 ibid.
86 Muir J pointed out in Cannon Street Pty Ltd v Karedis [2004] QSC 104 (Queensland Supreme Court
(QSC)) [176] that the applicant, in applying to the court for leave to bring proceedings ‘in a
sense, is assuming a role of the company’s directors’, who, as is trite, act under sanction by the
majority. It should be noted that the board is also subject to a duty to exercise corporate powers
for proper purposes which is duty is not satisﬁed by reference to the interests of the company: see
generally Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC). See also Scintronix Corp Ltd (for-
merly known as TTL Holdings Ltd) v Ho Kang Peng [2013] SGHC 34 (SGHC) [45].
87 Tremblett (n 44).
88 ibid 158.
89 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [13] (emphasis original).
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consideration of the applicant’s ‘clean hands’90 or lack thereof which would deny
him the right to act on behalf of the company. As Lawton LJ had stated in Nurcombe
v Nurcombe:91
[T]he court is entitled to look at the conduct of a plaintiff in a minority shareholder’s
action in order to satisfy itself that he is a proper person to bring the action on behalf
of the company and that the company itself will beneﬁt. A particular plaintiff may not
be a proper person because his conduct is tainted in some way which under the rules
of equity may bar relief.92
The case involved a wife who had commenced a derivative action against her
former husband in the name of the company in which they both held shares for
breach of duty in diverting a substantial contract to another company he effec-
tively owned. However, in matrimonial proceedings for ﬁnancial provision that
took place prior to the derivative action, the wife had been awarded a lump
sum which took account of the proﬁts her erstwhile husband had made out of
the diversion. The Court of Appeal afﬁrmed the lower court’s decision to
dismiss the action, and Lawton LJ stated:
In this action she is in effect saying: although I have shared with the ﬁrst defendant his ill-
gotten gains, I want the court to order that he should pay over to [the company] his share
of them plus my share so that I can have a chance of getting some more because of my
status as a shareholder. In my judgment, the court should not countenance such
conduct.93
The question then is: can this ‘sifting’ role of the good faith requirement neverthe-
less be fulﬁlled by the interests of the company requirement?
Rajah JA clearly thought not. In fact, in Rajah JA’s view, it is the good faith that
should be of primary concern. He stated:
[B]ad faith may be established where these questionable motives constitute a personal
purpose which indicates that the company’s interests will not be served, ie that s 216A
(3)(c) will not be satisﬁed.94
This is penetrating insight—if the applicant was acting without good faith, even
if there was objective legal merit to the proposed action, it would not be prima
facie in the company’s interests for that applicant to be given control of the
action. It is ventured with respect that this insight underscores the need for the sep-
arate requirement of good faith, and the need for it to be independently proved.
An application for leave signals only the start of proceedings for the company. If
the applicant is to be given control of these proceedings, it is appropriate that his
90 For a consideration of whether the doctrine of ‘clean hands’ ought to apply in derivative actions, see
Jennifer Payne, ‘“Clean Hands” in Derivative Actions’ (2002) 61 Cambridge Law Journal 76.
91 [1985] 1 WLR 370 (CA).
92 ibid 377.
93 ibid.
94 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [13] (emphasis added).
238 Of Links and Legal Merits
good faith, measured by reference to his suitability as a corporate representative
and the propriety of his intentions, be assessed so as to provide assurance that
the proposed proceedings will be prosecuted in the company’s interests.95
There is indeed a subtle difference in perspective between the interests of the
company requirement and the requirement of good faith. Whilst good faith
focuses the attention of the court on the person of the applicant, and the
inquiry is therefore necessarily substantially subjective, the ‘interests of the
company’ requirement directs attention to the ‘company’s separate and indepen-
dent welfare’.96 This has been said to import the ‘familiar concept of the interest of
the company as a whole’.97 The ‘interests of the company’ requirement therefore
respects the proper plaintiff rule by recognizing that the true plaintiff in the pro-
ceedings is the company, and it is its rights that are being vindicated. The fact that
this requirement is satisﬁed is however no assurance that the purpose for which the
action was brought was proper. It has been observed that one is hard put to ﬁnd ‘a
single case in which the court has found that a proposed derivative action was in
the interests of the company but failed to grant leave based on a lack of good
faith’,98 arguably suggesting that good faith is a necessary corollary to any pro-
posed action that is found to be in the company’s interests. But this is not
always the case, as the Ontario decision in Katana v Avsenik illustrates.99 As s
216A is based on the Ontario provisions, the requirements for leave are essentially
identical.
The case involved a dispute between the Katana and Avsenik families who have
been involved for many years in the business of producing shoes through, inter alia,
the company MAK Shoes Inc (‘MAK’) in which each side held a 50% stake.
Sometime ago, it was decided that the assets of MAK be sold to a company
known as Natural Comfort Ltd (‘Natural’) in which the families were also directly
or indirectly interested. The purchase price was satisﬁed by the delivery of a pro-
missory note secured under a general security agreement. As a consequence of
Natural’s subsequent poor economic performance, the families decided that it
should be wound up. They were however unable to agree as to how to deal
with its assets, and the dispute resulted in proceedings being commenced in
which each side sought different orders. These proceedings were then settled
through a settlement agreement entered into between various members of the
respective, and a consent order which resolved that litigation was made.
95 See Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Economic Reform Programme Bill 1998
[6.37], referred to by Austin J in Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 442
(NSWSC) [20].
96 Maher v Honeysett & Maher Electrical Contractors [2005] NSWSC 859 (NSWSC) [44]. It should be noted
that the Australian requirement as to interests of the company is couched slightly differently from
section 216A. The Corporations Act, s 237(3) requires the court to be satisﬁed that the proposed
action is in the best interests of the company. The standard of proof required is therefore higher.
97 ibid.
98 Puchniak and Tan (n 9) [9.25].
99 (2007) 161 ACWS (3d) 562 (Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Ontario SCJ)).
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Unfortunately, further disputes arose between the parties, and the present appli-
cation to commence derivative proceedings was made by a representative member
of the Katana family in the name of and on behalf of MAK alleging that, as it
remained a secured creditor of Natural, the latter ought to pay MAK pursuant
to the promissory note. The application was necessary as the Asvenik family
refused to approve the action. In support of the application, it was argued, inter
alia, that the settlement agreement did not bind MAK as it was not a party
thereto. On the evidence, the Court concluded that there was some possibility
that this argument might succeed. Accordingly, given the low standard of proof
applicable to the requirement as to interests of the company,100 the Court con-
sidered itself to have been satisﬁed as to the same. Given this ﬁnding, Wilton-
Siegel J considered the question whether the applicants were acting in good
faith to be ‘pivotal’.101 In this connection, the Court found that the applicants
had acted in bad faith in bringing the application. His Honour stated as follows:
This conclusion proceeds from the ﬁnding above that the intention of the parties to the
[settlement agreement], and related documentation, was that (… ) MAK [was] to
forbear from asserting [its] outstanding claims against Natural. By executing the [settle-
ment agreement], therefore, the parties thereto committed themselves to acting in good
faith to implement the objects of the [settlement agreement]. This duty to act in good
faith includes an obligation not to take any actions that would frustrate the objects of
the [settlement agreement]. I have concluded that by pursuing this action on behalf of
(… ) MAK, the applicants are doing exactly that — frustrating the object of the [settle-
ment agreement] (… ) — and are therefore acting in bad faith.102
The applicants’ purpose therefore was not to do justice to the company, but to
frustrate an agreement which they themselves had committed to.
The case also amply demonstrates why the suggestion to accord primacy to the
interests of the company requirement ought to be resisted. As pointed out earlier, s
216A does not require the applicant to show a prima facie case that bringing the
action is in the company’s interests, but only that there appears to be such a prima
facie case. This is a low standard indeed, and is, presumably, recognition that a
100 Ontario Business Corporations Act, s 246(2) requires that the court is satisﬁed that, inter alia, ‘(c) it
appears to be in the interests of the corporation (… ) that the action be brought (… )’. In Marc-Jay
Investments Inc v Levy (1974) 5 OR (2d) 235 (Ontario High Court of Justice (Ontario HCJ)), a case
which was referred to by our courts in a number of cases (see Teo Gek (n 70) [14]; Sinwa SS (HK)
Co Ltd (n 74) [24]; Poh Kim Chwee v Lim Swee Long [1998] SGHC 186 (SGHC) [18]), O’Leary J
had stated (at [9]–[10]):
It is obvious that a Judge hearing an application for leave to commence an action, cannot try the
action. I believe it is my function to deny the application if it appears that the intended action is
frivolous or vexatious or is bound to be unsuccessful (… ) I am not to deny leave to bring an
action simply because on a weighing of the evidence I should decide it is unlikely that the
action will be successful.
101 (2007) 161 ACWS (3d) 562 (Ontario SCJ) [89].
102 ibid [91].
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minority shareholder is usually not in a position to obtain sufﬁcient evidence at the
leave stage so as to be able to found a prima facie case. As Prakash J observed in
Fong Wai Lyn Carolyn v Airtrust (Singapore) Pte Ltd:103
It is often the case that a party making the application for leave is not privy and does not
have access to signiﬁcant documents held by the company or its controlling directors. It is
not surprising to ﬁnd that complaints in such proceedings have been partly based upon
information received, belief and inference.104
In Ang Thiam Swee, the Court of Appeal suggested that the requirement in s 216A
(3)(c) is concerned mainly with the objective legal merits of the case. Hence, if the appli-
cant has shown that the proposed action was not frivolous or vexatious,105 and
therefore of legal merit, the ‘interests of the company’ requirement would be
satisﬁed:
It is plain that at this interlocutory stage, the standard of proof required is low, and only
the most obviously unmeritorious claims will be culled. (… ) In determining whether the
requirement in s 216A(3)(c) has been satisﬁed, apart from a detached assessment of the
merits in prosecuting the proposed statutory derivative action, the court may also go
further to examine whether it would be in the practical and commercial interests of
the company for the action to be brought.106
Given this low standard, the good faith requirement is, as Wilton-Siegel J noted,
indeed pivotal. Its role is to ensure that the careful balance, between providing an
effective avenue for the protection of the minority and preventing abuse of this
very avenue, which the imposition of these ‘strict’ prerequisites is intended to
maintain, is not tilted too far in favour of the minority shareholder given the rela-
tive ease of satisfying the interests of the company requirement.
If this pivotal nature of the good faith requirement is accepted, the question that
necessarily follows is: how should good faith be positively proven?
C PROOF OF GOOD FAITH
The difﬁculties of positively establishing good faith have already been alluded to.
As Rajah JA observed, the assessment of good faith is often ‘obtruded by the qua-
liﬁcation that this issue is a matter for the court to determine on the particular facts
of each case’.107 Given the myriad possible factual circumstances that may present
themselves in s 216A applications, no two cases are likely to be identical. Any
attempt to craft a single test or deﬁnition is not only difﬁcult, but also possibly
103 [2011] SGHC 88 (SGHC) 980.
104 ibid [28].
105 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [55].
106 ibid [55]–[56] (emphasis added).
107 ibid [12].
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unwise.108 This notwithstanding, Rajah JA made it clear that a ‘conceptual frame-
work’ is necessary in order to guide the court in its exercise of discretion. There
appears to be two distinct aspects to Rajah JA’s schema. First, the applicant’s
purpose for making the s 216A application must have ‘an obvious nexus with the
company’s beneﬁt or interests’.109 An applicant acts in good faith only if he is
bringing the application for the proper purpose of advancing the company’s inter-
ests. Second, the court must be satisﬁed that the applicant honestly intends to serve
the company’s interests. This latter more subjective inquiry is targeted at establish-
ing whether the applicant is a ‘proper party to represent the company’s inter-
ests’.110 Rajah JA’s framework is therefore one that is closely tied to the raison
d’être for the good faith requirement. These two aspects are likely to overlap, not
just because similar factors and considerations are relevant to both aspects, but
more signiﬁcantly, because of their inter-reliance. Thus, a conclusion that the
purpose of the action is to advance the company’s interests is likely to lead to at
least an inference that the applicant intends to act in the company’s interests.
1 The Applicant’s Purpose
An applicant would not be acting in good faith if he was not pursuing the deriva-
tive action to vindicate the company’s rights and advance its interests. Rajah JA
had observed that ‘the court ought to assess the motivations of the applicant in
order to determine whether he is acting in good faith’.111 In this regard, the appli-
cant’s purpose may be discerned by examining his motivations. His personal feel-
ings, which can also constitute motives, are somewhat less helpful in ascertaining
his purpose.112 Thus, the fact that the applicant was moved or spurred by personal
animus, and even malice,113 against the defendant(s) cannot, by itself, inexorably
lead to an inference that his purpose was improper. This was recognised by the
Court of Appeal in Pang Yong Hock which had observed that ‘[h]ostility between
the factions involved is (… ) generally insufﬁcient evidence of lack of good
faith’.114 As Palmer J noted in Swansson v RA Pratt Properties Pty Ltd,115 ‘it is not
the law that only a plaintiff who feels good will towards a defendant is entitled
to sue’.116
Instead, it is the objective facts that must be scrutinized. This includes the appli-
cant’s allegations and the circumstances out of which they arose,117 as well as the
108 Swansson (n 21) [35] (Palmer J).
109 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [13].
110 ibid (italics omitted).
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
113 Swansson (n 21) [41].
114 Pang Yong Hock (n 26) [20].
115 Swansson (n 21).
116 ibid [41].
117 Vinciguerra (n 21) [56].
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ultimate effect of the proposed litigation. It is from these factors that the court will
draw the necessary inferences as to the applicant’s purpose. Whilst it is true that
‘good faith’ connotes a particular state of mind which must be found to exist in
the applicant, it has been judicially pointed out that a sworn assertion that relevant
state of mind ‘which by necessity will almost always be unqualiﬁed opinion
founded on hearsay (… ) and will be dependent upon the advice of lawyers (
… ) must be of little weight or utility; and the objective facts and circumstances
will speak louder than the applicant’s words.’118
Further, an applicant who acts out of self-interest is not necessarily spurred by
improper purposes. The question is the nature of the applicant’s self-interest.
Where the applicant’s self-interest is aligned with the company’s interests,119
such as where he is seeking to maximise the value of or restore value to his
shares in the company, the applicant’s purpose is proper. As Tysoe J observed
in Primex Investments Ltd v Northwest Sports Enterprises Ltd:
Anything that beneﬁts a company will indirectly beneﬁt its shareholders by increasing the
share value and it is hard to imagine a situation where a shareholder will not have a self
interest in wanting the company to prosecute an action which it is in the interests to
prosecute.120
Indeed, the fact that the applicant has a stake of this nature in the proposed liti-
gation is often taken as a positive indication of good faith,121 and counts as a ‘rela-
tively easy’122 case of good faith. As Palmer J explained:
Where the application is made by a current shareholder of a company who has more
than a token shareholding and the derivative action seeks recovery of property so that
the value of the applicant’s shares would be increased, good faith will be relatively
easy for the applicant to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction.123
These statements recognise that the reality is that an applicant is, in most cases,
unlikely to be able to demonstrate absolute purity of purpose, untainted by ancil-
lary considerations. This should not, in many cases, lead to a conclusion of bad
faith. This notwithstanding, there is clearly some point at which the applicant’s
self-interest, or his collateral motivations, crosses over to the side that indicates
impropriety of purpose. The difﬁculty is in identifying that point. Rajah JA had
noted that there is at present no test that has been articulated to assist in identifying
this critical juncture. His Honour however suggested that a workable test might be
whether the applicant’s collateral motives were such as to render the application
118 Maher (n 96) [33] (Brereton J). See also Vinciguerra (n 21) [56].
119 Primex Investments Ltd v Northwest Sports Enterprises Ltd (1995) 13 BCLR (3d) 300 (BCSC) [42]. For a
similar, but more generous proposition, see Discovery Enterprises (n 22) [122].
120 (1995) 13 BCLR (3d) 300 (BCCA) [42].
121 Chahwan (n 21) [74].
122 Swansson (n 21) [38].
123 ibid.
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an abuse of the court’s process.124 The general principle of abuse of court process
was stated by Evershed MR in Re Majory, A Debtor, Ex parte The Debtor v F A Dumont
Ld in the following manner:
[C]ourt proceedings may not be used or threatened for the purpose of obtaining for the
person so using or threatening them some collateral advantage to himself, and not for the
purpose for which such proceedings are properly designed and exist; and a party so using
or threatening proceedings will be liable to be held guilty of abusing the process of the
court and therefore disqualiﬁed from invoking the powers of the court by proceedings
he has abused.125
As noted in Pang Yong Hock,126 s 216A was designed to provide a procedure for
the ‘protection of genuinely aggrieved minority interests and for doing justice to a
company’.127 Thus, if the applicant demonstrates that his collateral purpose is ‘suf-
ﬁciently consistent with the purpose of “doing justice to a company” (… ) so that
he is not abusing the statute, and by extension, also the company, as a vehicle for
his own aims and interests’,128 there would be no abuse of process. When would
the applicant’s collateral motives or purpose be so ‘sufﬁciently consistent’?
In the English decision of Iesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd,129 Lewison J, in considering
whether the claimants were acting in good faith, applied the deﬁnition of ‘collateral
advantage’ given by Bridge LJ in Goldsmith v Sperrings Ltd.130 Bridge LJ had stated:
For the purpose of [the general rule on abuse of process], what is meant by a ‘collateral
advantage’? The phrase manifestly cannot embrace every advantage sought or obtained
by a litigant which it is beyond the court’s power to grant him. (… ) In my judgment, one
can certainly go so far as to say that when a litigant sues to redress a grievance no object
which he may seek to obtain can be condemned as a collateral advantage if it is reason-
ably related to the provision of some form of redress for that grievance. On the other
hand, if it can be shown that a litigant is pursuing an ulterior purpose unrelated to the subject matter
of the litigation and that, but for his ulterior purpose, he would not have commenced proceedings at all,
that is an abuse of process. These two cases are plain; but there is, I think, a difﬁcult area
in between. What if a litigant with a genuine cause of action, which he would wish to
pursue in any event, can be shown also to have an ulterior purpose in view as a
desired by-product of the litigation? Can he on that ground be debarred from proceed-
ing? I very much doubt it.131
124 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [30].
125 [1955] Ch 600 (CA) 623–24.
126 Pang Yong Hock (n 26).
127 ibid [19]. See also Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [31].
128 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [31].
129 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch).
130 [1977] 1 WLR 478 (CA). This was a libel case in which the defendant distributors of a fortnightly
paper applied for an order that the actions against them should be stayed or dismissed as an abuse of
the process of the court as the plaintiff’s purpose in pursuing actions against the distributors was
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In Iesini, the claimant was a minority shareholder in the company Westrip, and
was seeking permission to bring a derivative claim on behalf of Westrip against its
directors for breach of duty. The claimant alleged that the directors’ conduct had
led to Westrip losing its valuable assets, and that the claim was necessary to reverse
this alleged asset-stripping. The question of the claimant’s good faith arose as his
bringing of the derivative action was supported by an indemnity as to costs and
damages provided by Greenland, an Australian company. Greenland had
earlier entered into a joint venture agreement with Westrip, which it now
regretted and wished to get out of. The claimant had agreed, in return for the
indemnity, to use his best endeavours to procure Westrip to enter into an agree-
ment to terminate that joint venture. The defendant directors argued that the
action was not being brought for the beneﬁt of Westrip but for the beneﬁt of
Greenland. The evidence, however, indicated that the company stood to
recover substantial compensation if the claim succeeded. Lewison J held that
the fact that a derivative claim was brought partly for collateral reasons, or
where the claimant would derive other beneﬁts therefrom, would not disqualify
the claimant from bringing the claim if the claim was ultimately for the beneﬁt
of the company. His Honour stated:
[I]t seems clear to me that [the claimant] was entitled to form the view that unless the
derivative claim was brought, Westrip would be left with no assets at all. Thus, in my
judgment, the dominant purpose of the action was to beneﬁt Westrip. It cannot, in my
judgment, be said that but for the collateral purpose, the claim would not have been
brought at all. The claim is, in my judgment, brought in good faith.132
Nevertheless, the abuse of process yardstick may, on occasion, be too narrow to
cover all potential situations of bad faith. If a wrong has been committed against
the company, the shareholder applicant is likely to be, in most cases, ‘genuinely
aggrieved’. And if the company stood to beneﬁt should the prosecution of the
action be successful, it could be said that justice would, by the derivative action,
be done to the company. In such cases, there is technically no abuse of process
as the section is being utilised for the purposes for which it was enacted.133 And
yet, if a further step were to be taken to examine the ultimate consequences
that are likely to follow the successful derivative suit, an inference may be made
that the applicant was in truth seeking to gain some beneﬁt which he should
not, ‘in good conscience’,134 receive. As Palmer J explained in Swansson:
Such a beneﬁt would include, for example, a double recovery by the applicant for a
wrong suffered or recompense for a wrongful act inﬂicted upon the company in which
the applicant was a direct and knowing participant with the proposed defendant in the
132 [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch).
133 See Swansson (n 21) [43].
134 ibid.
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derivative action. In such a case, the law would not permit the applicant to derive a
beneﬁt from his or her own wrongdoing.135
In a factual context reminiscent of Nurcombe v Nurcombe,136 the applicant in
Swansson had sought leave of court to bring proceedings in the name of the
company against her former husband for making certain payments in breach of
his directors’ duties for his own beneﬁt and for the beneﬁt of companies in
which the couple were both interested. As part of the divorce proceedings, a
deed of settlement was entered into which allegedly took account of these pay-
ments. The applicant denied this. On the evidence, Palmer J was unable to
make a positive ﬁnding as to whether she did or did not receive any such
beneﬁt and whether she was or was not seeking double recovery. Noting,
however, that the applicant bore the onus of proving her good faith on a
balance of probabilities, his Honour concluded as follows:
The circumstances to which I have referred, taken together, cause me to hesitate in
accepting at face value the untested assertions of [the applicant]. The onus is upon her
to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction that she is acting in good faith in making the
application. In my opinion, she has not discharged that onus. I am not able to feel a com-
fortable degree of satisfaction that sufﬁcient facts have emerged to justify a ﬁnding in
[her] favour.137
The case of Chahwan v Euphoric Pty Ltd provides another example.138 The appli-
cant was the sole director and holder of all the issued shares in the company
Bycoon which owned certain land. The land was mortgaged to Euphoric as a con-
dition for its supply of fuel to Bycoon on credit terms. The applicant claimed that the
mortgage was granted byBycoon’s then sole director (whowas the applicant’s sister)
in breach of her directors’ duties, and that as Euphoric had knowledge of these con-
traventions, it held the interest in the land as constructive trustee for Bycoon. The
applicant sought leave to bring an action in the name of the company against
Euphoric for declarations to this effect. The impetus for the application however
was to facilitate the applicant’s claim against Bycoon that the latter held all its inter-
est in the land upon trust for him, as he had provided the funds for the acquisition of
the land. On the issue of good faith, it was argued that as the applicant was doing no
more than seeking to exercise the lawful rights of the company, therewas no abuse of
process and his conduct could not be said to lack good faith.139 Tobias JA however
noted, ‘[T]he expression “acting in good faith” (… ) extends beyond conduct that
would constitute an abuse of process’.140 In the ﬁnal analysis, asserting Bycoon’s
rights via the derivative action was merely a step towards the applicant’s real
135 ibid.
136 See (n 91).
137 ibid [52].
138 Chahwan (n 21) [81].
139 ibid [53].
140 ibid [81].
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purpose of ultimately taking the entire beneﬁt of the claim personally.141 Tobias JA
stated as follows:
[I]t must be kept well in mind that the onus lies upon the applicant to satisfy the court
that, in applying to it for leave to bring the relevant proceedings, he or she is acting in
good faith. If such an applicant is in reality seeking to further his or her own personal
interests other than as a current or former shareholder of the company, rather than
the interests of the company as a whole, then in my view that onus will not have been
discharged (… ) It thus matters not that the conduct in question would not support a
ﬁnding of abuse of process.142
The issue, it appears, is ultimately one of degree and of balance. What appears to
be crucial is whether the court can be convinced that, even absent the collateral
purpose or beneﬁt, the applicant would still have forged ahead in an attempt to
vindicate the company’s rights.
2 Honest Intent
The second aspect of Rajah JA’s schema requires a consideration of the subjec-
tive intent of the applicant. As alluded to before, this is important in the overall
assessment of whether the applicant is the ‘proper party to represent the com-
pany’s interests’.143 The applicant’s motives are also relevant here. An applicant
who is ‘so motivated by vendetta, perceived or real, that his judgment will be
clouded by purely personal considerations’ is not likely to serve the company’s
interests.144 In this case, it would be judicious to deny leave to that particular
applicant on the ground that he would not be a proper person to represent
the company.
An important factor that supports the existence of an intention to serve the com-
pany’s interests is the applicant’s belief in the viability of the cause of action.
Clearly the applicant can only intend to serve the company’s interests if he
believed that a good cause of action with a reasonable prospect of success exists.
In this regard, Rajah JA appeared to have embraced a purely subjective assess-
ment of the applicant’s belief:
While the applicant’s good faith and the merits of his application need not be uncon-
nected (… ), they are not necessarily connected. Contrary to Prakash J’s view in
Carolyn Fong,145 an applicant might—albeit quixotically—seek to bring a statutory
141 ibid [67], [76], [77], [83]–[84].
142 ibid [83].
143 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [13].
144 Pang Yong Hock (n 67) [20]; Ang Thiam Swee (n 8) [29].
145 Prakash J had summarised the principles established in the local cases as including the proposition
that ‘bad faith is usually inferred from the lack of an arguable cause of action or a prima facie case’:
Fong Wai (n 29) [72].
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derivative action in good faith even where there is no arguable or legitimate case to be
advanced (… )146
However, a purely subjective view of the applicant’s belief as a deciding factor of
his good faith is in fact not the typical approach adopted in either Australia or
Canada.147 In Swansson, for example, Palmer J had explicitly observed that
‘whether the applicant honestly holds such a belief would not simply be a
matter of bald assertion: the applicant may be disbelieved if no reasonable
person in the circumstances would hold that belief’.148 Similarly, the Canadian
cases have tended to also require that the requirement of good faith be anchored
by an objective consideration of the legal merits of the proposed action. The
observations of the Alberta Court of Appeal in Valgardson v Valgardson are
representative:
The question of good faith requires the court to ensure that the proposed action is not
frivolous or vexatious. There is both a subjective and objective component to the require-
ment of good faith. The subjective aspect requires that the applicant believes the pro-
posed derivative action has merit. This guards against actions spurned by self-interest
or private vendetta. But even where the applicant believes that the proposed action
has merit, the court must consider whether objectively viewed the action is not frivolous
and vexatious.149
D CONCLUSION
The statutory action is conceptualised as a tool for serving and advancing corpor-
ate interests.150 Imposing a requirement for the applicant to establish his good
faith compels an examination as to whether this is indeed the case. A conclusion
that the action is prima facie in the company’s interests does little to ensure this. As
Gilmour J suggested in Vinciguerra v MG Corrosion,151 the shareholder might have
acted with a collateral purpose even if the company itself stood to obtain some
beneﬁt from a successful conclusion to the derivative action. Propriety of
purpose underpins the very inquiry into the good faith of the applicant. It
seems obvious therefore that there is good reason for the independence of the
146 Ang Thiam Swee (n 8).
147 Indeed, one is reminded of the wry observation made by Bowen LJ a long time ago that a person’s
bona ﬁdes cannot be the sole test, for otherwise ‘you might have a lunatic conducting the affairs of the
company, and paying away its money with both hands in a manner perfectly bona ﬁde yet perfectly
irrational’: Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654 (CA) 671.
148 Swansson (n 21) [36]. See also Chahwan (n 21).
149 [2012] ABCA 124, (2012) 98 BLR (4
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) 223 (Alberta Court of Appeal) [20] (references omitted).
150 The personal interests of the applicant shareholder are often simultaneously served. Indeed, this is
far from unusual given that any gain to the company often results in a corresponding advantage to
the shareholder. As pointed out above, the Canadian courts have treated such alignment of interests
as being indicative of the applicant’s good faith.
151 [2010] FCA 763 (FCA) [66].
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good faith requirement. It has been pointed out that a shareholder, who applies to
court to bring proceedings in the name of a company, is ‘in a sense (… ) assuming
a role of the company’s directors’.152 Seen in this light, it cannot be inappropriate
for the applicant to be subject to those strictures rooted in bona ﬁdes that have long
been applicable to the acts and determinations of directors.
152 Cannon Street (n 86) [176] (Muir J).
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